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A number of recent studies have put human subjects in true social interactions, with the
aim of better identifying the psychophysiological processes underlying social cognition.
Interestingly, this emerging Neuroscience of Social Interactions (NSI) ﬁeld brings up chal-
lenges which resemble important ones in the ﬁeld of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI).
Importantly, these challenges go beyond common objectives such as the eventual use of
BCI and NSI protocols in the clinical domain or common interests pertaining to the use
of online neurophysiological techniques and algorithms. Common fundamental challenges
are now apparent and one can argue that a crucial one is to develop computational mod-
els of brain processes relevant to human interactions with an adaptive agent, whether
human or artiﬁcial. Coupled with neuroimaging data, such models have proved promising
in revealing the neural basis and mental processes behind social interactions. Similar mod-
els could help BCI to move from well-performing but ofﬂine static machines to reliable
online adaptive agents.This emphasizes a social perspective to BCI, which is not limited to
a computational challenge but extends to all questions that arise when studying the brain
in interaction with its environment.
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decoding
At ﬁrst sight, the recent ﬁeld of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCI)
and the even more recent ﬁeld of Neuroscience of Social Inter-
actions (NSI) do not have much in common and at ﬁrst glance
appear totally unrelated. The aim of the former is to create an
interface between a brain and an artiﬁcial agent, while the lat-
ter is exclusively interested in the interaction between two or
more human minds. They have also emerged from different sci-
entiﬁc communities. BCI developed thanks to the efforts of a
few adventurous engineers (Vidal, 1973), clinicians, and physi-
ologists (Birbaumer et al., 1999), while social neuroscience has
built on ethology, sociobiology, social psychology, and philoso-
phy (Adolphs, 2003). Nevertheless, both have recently attracted
neuroscientists, and while BCI rely on explicit, real-time, and
often closed-loop connections, an emerging trend in the study
of social cognition is the move toward online experiments, with
realistic interactions between a subject and a social (human or
human-like) environment (Redcay et al., 2010; Schilbach et al.,
2010).
In BCI, the human brain is typically connected to a non-social
(artiﬁcial) device, whose aim is to reinstate behavior, including
social behavior. However, even though it is not only this ultimate
objective but the strongest link between the two might rather lie
in the nature of the interaction itself. Indeed, both are essentially
concerned with the instantiation and the study of a dynamical
exchange between two agents. This shared core aspect provides
strong ground for possible cross-fertilization between the two
ﬁelds in the near future. This becomes particularly striking when
looking at the main challenges faced by BCI.
WHAT IS BCI?
In a broad sense, a BCI refer to some direct interface between the
brain and the outside world, bypassing the usual sensory or motor
pathways. BCI provide the brain with a new way of interacting
with the environment, where the latter refers to the user’s own
body (Moritz et al., 2008) or to other people (Birbaumer, 2006).
Although one might categorize as BCI, those artiﬁcial systems
that directly stimulate the brain (implants or deep brain stimu-
lators), BCI usually refer to devices that enable the brain to act
upon or via a machine (Nicolelis, 2001). Here I will focus on
the latter, in which feedback from the machine or the environ-
ment is usually obtained through normal sensation, although it
could also be delivered to the brain directly (O’Doherty et al.,
2011).
Essentially, such BCI rely on online decoding and conversion
of brain activity into reliable commands or understandable infor-
mation. As such, electrophysiology techniques are usually favored,
although fMRI has been used successfully in real-time (DeCharms,
2008). EEG is by far the most widely used BCI technique, either
with patients or healthy volunteers, simply because it is cheap,
portable, and non-invasive and it offers a high temporal resolution
(Millan and Carmena, 2009).
Brain-Computer Interfaces developments are mostly driven by
clinical applications, to replace or restore lost communication or
locomotion abilities in patients suffering from severe neuromus-
cular disorders. Another promising line of research is the use
of BCI techniques in disorders of consciousness, to better diag-
nose non-responsive patients (Kübler and Kotchoubey, 2007) and
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possibly to communicate with those in a minimally conscious
state (Cruse et al., 2011). Furthermore, in various pathologies (as
diverse as attention disorders and hyperactivity, depression,motor
deﬁcits, tinnitus. . .), BCI could also prove useful in devising new
therapies based upon neurophysiological training (Johnston et al.,
2010).
Finally, BCI are also being investigated for general public appli-
cations such as gaming (Plass-Oude Bos et al., 2010). Altogether,
BCI applications have been particularly efﬁcient in promoting
the development of new, wireless, and gel-free EEG technologies
(Zander et al., 2011). Such systems are very useful and are almost
essential for data acquisition outside the laboratory, not only for
clinical trials but also for ecologicalNSI experiments involving sev-
eral brain-scanned participants (so-called hyperscanning; Dumas
et al., 2011).
WHAT IS SOCIAL ABOUT BCI?
Brain-Computer Interfaces clearly overlap with social neuro-
science, at least in as much as the two ﬁelds share common
objectives. Even though they have not yet contributed to new
therapies, BCIs aim to improve the quality of life of patients who
suffer due to an inability to interact with the environment and
whose interactions with others are thereby severely limited. A suc-
cessful BCI would enable such patients to recover social abilities,
namely interacting, communicating, exchanging, and even play-
ing with others. However, despite tremendous efforts and partial
success, BCI research is yet to establish and produce such a routine
application. Even the widely explored P300-based (Perrin et al.,
2011) and motor imagery protocols (Pfurtscheller et al., 2009)
have proven limited in their robustness and efﬁciency, despite
the fact that they rely on fairly reproducible neurophysiological
markers associated with simple mental tasks. The reason for this
might be that these markers do not directly reﬂect the user’s pre-
cise intention. Indeed, the P300-speller, for instance, exploits the
EEG response evoked by an expected but rare stimulus (item) pre-
sented in a sequence of undesired events (other items). Hence the
machine does not infer the intended words from their direct and
transient neuronal representations but rather detects and com-
pares the automated, unspeciﬁc, and time-locked responses to a
sequence of proposed items. Similarly, although the sensorimo-
tor rhythms (SMR) elicited by mental imagery do reﬂect a motor
related activity that is usually coherent with the intended move-
ment (e.g., imagery of a right hand movement to move to the
right), this activity can hardly be used online to infer all the ﬁne
parameters of the movement plan.
This incomplete or non-ecological mapping between the actual
command and the ultimate action might contribute to the sub-
optimality of BCI and could partially explain the high inter-subject
performance variability and the so-called BCI illiteracy observed
in healthy volunteers and patients (Vidaurre and Blankertz, 2010;
Maby et al., 2011).
To overcome this lack of reliability, BCI research faces at least
three crucial challenges:
• To deal with the complex, multidimensional, dynamical, non-
linear, and highly distributed nature of the neural code;
• To endow the machine with adaptive behavior;
• To make use of rich, multidimensional, and robust feedback
that favors learning and cooperation with the user.
Interestingly, each of these challenges points to a different part
or perspective of the Brain-Computer interaction. As expounded
below, taken together, these perspectives emphasize the fundamen-
tal and technical challenges that BCI share with the ﬁeld of NSI.
THE MACHINE’S PERSPECTIVE
In BCI, the machine or computer is the one that transforms brain
activity into actions. It has to select relevant brain signals and
decode them online. Although this decoding challenge is often
circumvented by making use of substitution strategies (e.g., fre-
quency tagging to create a“brain switch”; Pfurtscheller et al., 2010),
it is reasonable to assume that decoding should improve as we
progress in our ability to decipher the neural code in real-time. In
other words, provided that one can measure the relevant signals,
the performance of BCI should increase with our knowledge of
how intentions, ensuingbehaviors, and evenperceptionof the con-
sequences of our own actions map onto brain dynamics (Serences
and Saproo, 2012).
In that respect, the future of BCI depends heavily on our ability
to reveal and to interpret the neuronal mechanisms and men-
tal processes underlying human perception, action, learning, and
decision making but also imagination, prediction, and attention.
Such processes are all core components of social behavior (Frith
and Frith, 2012). It has even been suggested that the most complex
forms of these processes emerged in human beings because of our
very social nature (Dunbar, 2011). From this ﬁrst point of view
alone, BCI should beneﬁt from future NSI studies.
However, beyond studies that aim at identifying the neural
correlates of human mental processes, NSI protocols, and BCI
should take into consideration studies that incorporate and vali-
date computational models of how the brain implements relevant
cognitive and motor tasks (Wolpert et al., 2003). This suggests a
paradigm switch and comes with methodological and technical
challenges. Fortunately, such models and methods have recently
emerged from computational neuroscience and have been used
to shed light on neuroimaging data (Friston and Dolan, 2010),
including experiments on social neuroscience (Behrens et al.,
2009).
Importantly, for BCI and for NSI protocols, these models have
a twofold interest:
• In NSI protocols they can be used to explain and question
the speciﬁcity of social behavior in terms of underlying brain
mechanisms. An elegant example is the work of Behrens and
collaborators who showed that, although instantiated in differ-
ent brain regions, reward, and social information are processed
with similar cognitive and neuronal mechanisms in order to
optimize behavior (Behrens et al., 2008). Importantly for BCI,
this so-called model-based fMRI approach has recently been
applied successfully with non-invasive electrophysiology data
(Philiastides et al., 2010). Alternatively, these models could also
be used to emulate an avatar (or a robot Wolpert and Flanagan,
2010) and to test subjects involved in a true social interaction
with a well-controlled human-like environment.
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• Similarly, in BCI, they could be used to reﬁne the online decod-
ing of brain activity.Apromising example is thework byBroder-
sen and collaborators who used a computational model of
neurodynamics and thus improved decoding by restricting the
relevant feature space to a sparse and biologically meaningful
representation (Brodersen et al., 2011). Alternatively, computa-
tional models could also be used to endow the machine with
(human-inspired) artiﬁcial intelligence, namely to relieve the
strain on the user and implement shared control of continuous
actions. Such models could be informed online by complemen-
tary neurophysiological markers. In a recent study for instance,
we demonstrated that the user’s electrophysiological responses
to the machine’s decisions reﬂected human learning and could
also be used by the BCI system to distinguish between error and
correct decisions (Perrin et al., 2011).
THE EXPERIMENTER’S PERSPECTIVE
In BCI, the experimenter is the one who designs the whole inter-
face. It is the experimenter who is in charge of endowing the
machine with signal feature selection, classiﬁcation or hidden-
state inference aswell as decision-making algorithms.An emerging
trend in the BCI ﬁeld is the design of adaptive methods in order to
avoid the need for cumbersome initial calibrations and to accom-
modate the slow ﬂuctuations of brain activity, due to physical
drifts, drowsiness, or learning phenomena (Vidaurre et al., 2006).
This is particularly relevant for applications in which BCI is used
for monitoring (Blankertz et al., 2010). In this respect, model-
based decoding approaches like those mentioned above can be
thought of as adaptive methods. Relying on cognitive and neu-
ronal generative models of relevant brain signals, they are adaptive
in nature since they aim at mimicking the dynamics of mind and
brain.
This puts the BCI experimenter into a rather new situation.
Instead of considering the BCI user’s brain as a black box and
instead of taking a static machine’s perspective, the experimenter
is forced to adopt a systemic view and to consider the human and
artiﬁcial agents as a whole. From a practical viewpoint, this means
that he or she is now faced with two inter-dependent choices. The
ﬁrst one is about the model of the user’s brain activity that the
machine should be endowed with. The second choice concerns
the learning and decision-making algorithms that will generate
actions from the machine, based on its ongoing perception and
inference of the user’s mental states.
These choiceswill be guidedby the targetedBCI application and
the signal at hand. But most importantly, this procedure amounts
to endowing the interacting computer in the BCI, with some
degree of theory of mind or mentalizing properties, a core and
well documented concept in social neuroscience (Frith and Frith,
2012). This brings BCI andNSI even closer; the latter being directly
committed to studying, modeling and testing the computational
and neuronal mechanisms of mentalizing.
As a consequence, developing a mechanistic account of socially
relevant processes such as reward learning and intention tracking
(implicit mentalizing) will likely beneﬁt BCI design in the long
term.
Luckily enough, recent experimental and theoretical work has
shed light on such mechanisms. Some have even paved the way
toward generic frameworks that could be used to formalize, imple-
ment, test, and compare alternative models of such mechanisms.
Just to mention a few, the predictive coding and Bayesian brain
hypotheses are supported by a growing body of evidence from
studies examining cognitive functions relevant to social neuro-
science (e.g., Kilner et al., 2007; Peters and Büchel, 2010). Further-
more, a meta-Bayesian framework has been proposed to imple-
ment and test models of learning and decision making (Daunizeau
et al., 2010). Hierarchical models have also been suggested as an
optimal tool to incorporate constraints and to implement ﬂexi-
ble and efﬁcient control (Todorov, 2009). Finally, the free-energy
principle proposed by Friston has been shown to enable the online
inference of states and parameters of hierarchical dynamical mod-
els that can be used to either prescribe or recognize actions and
intentions (Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2011).
To sum up, the explicit need for decoding models in BCI on
the one hand, and the promising experimental and theoretical
ﬁndings about mechanisms and processes relevant to social neu-
roscience, on the other hand, speak in favor of a new generation
of BCI based on such advances and whose development might
parallel that of NSI.
THE HUMAN’S PERSPECTIVE
In BCI, the human is the end-user, the one who will beneﬁt from
the interaction and the one to whom it should adapt. The user
will eventually validate the interface and adopt this new way of
interacting with the world. This emphasizes a crucial need: the full
cooperation of the adaptive interacting machine. Thus, while not
all social interactions are relevant to BCI cooperative ones are def-
initely relevant. There is no real symmetry between the two agents
here, and the user knows it. Nevertheless, the more sophisticated
the machine, the more it might be perceived as helpful and the
more the user might engage the interaction (Krach et al., 2008).
Note that in this context, sophistication could be understood as
complexity in a broad and common sense, but could also refer
to the degree of recursion in the machine’s representation of the
user’s representation, that is the order of the mentalizing machine
(Yoshida et al., 2008).
Whether endowing the machine with advanced decoding and
adaptive capacities based on mentalizing as well as human-
inspired learning and decision-making models will be successful
and sufﬁcient to signiﬁcantly improve current BCI is an openques-
tion that can only be answered with online experiments. As such,
BCI could well become a peculiar but useful neuroscience para-
digm of social interactions (Obbink, 2011), enabling researchers
to tackle questions such as: how much control should the machine
take over? What degree of sophistication would provoke a percep-
tual switch in the user and transform the machine or tool into an
agent or partner (Johnson, 2003)? When does the interface turn
into a dyadic interaction? What would be the condition of opti-
mal joint-decision making and would it compare to known social
situations, in animal models (Seeley et al., 2012) or in humans
(Bahrami et al., 2010)?
CONCLUSION
The aim of both BCI and social neuroscience is to conceive and
implement real-time interaction protocols, whether they involve
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online decoding of neural activity or simply make use of classical
behavioral responses from the actor. They both call for compu-
tational models of an interacting mind, whether with an artiﬁcial
but adaptive agent or with another human being. They will both
beneﬁt from uncovering the neural mechanisms of such an inter-
action to establish and later implement an optimal shared control
that differs depending on the context of the interaction. They also
both motivate the coupling of electrophysiology and neuroimag-
ing techniques with advanced technologies such as robotics and
immersive virtual environments. Therefore it is likely that BCI and
NSI protocols will be mutually beneﬁcial in the near future, with
this unlikely collaboration answering diverse questions related to
theoretical, technical, methodological, but also clinical and even
ethical issues (Blanke and Aspell, 2009).
Central to these commonneeds andobjectives aremodels of the
brain as a computational machine, as well as models of neuronal
dynamics (Friston and Dolan, 2010). Crucially, and especially
in NSI and BCI protocols, our ability to use them online could
yield new experimental paradigms and applications (Kelso et al.,
2009).
In NSI protocols, these models would help in the study and
characterization, from a neuronal and psychological point of
view, of the dynamics of true interactions. Such NSI experiments
would help identify realistic and efﬁcient models of social inter-
actions that BCI could then use to instantiate more productive
interactions, between an adaptive machine and a patient. In one
category of clinical applications, the patient would perceive or
even incorporate the adaptive BCI as a means to communicate
with people or to act upon the world. This is typically the aim
of neuroprosthetics. In the other category, the adaptive machine
itself would be perceived as the world or agent to exchange with.
This could be the case in future forms of Neurofeedback training.
The latter is of particular interest with respect to NSI proto-
cols. Indeed, it is a typical situation where the BCI is not meant
to be fully cooperative but should trigger adaptation or learn-
ing from the patient in order to bring him up to a stable and
non-pathological state. This considerablywidens the putative clin-
ical scope of BCI. It could potentially even be used with patients
with deﬁcits in social interactions such as people with autism.
Indeed, whereas the existing evidence does not support the use
of neurofeedback in the treatment of autism spectrum disorder
(Holtmann et al., 2011), a new generation of adaptive and biolog-
ically informed systems could well prove reliable and efﬁcient in
treating such patients as it is well-known that these patients favor
predictable or slowly varying agents, such as machines to interact
with and learn from (Qian and Lipkin, 2011).
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